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Aesthetic Attitude Theory As a Factor 
in Art and Art Education 
Timothy Hicks 

The Plight of Essentialist Thinking : Common Denominators, 
Generalizations, 'Real' and 'True' Definitions of Art 
Aesthetic Attitude theory is fundamental to essentialist thinking. 
Ideally it is a logical, internally coherent set of ideas about beauty, the 
imagination, and the art experience. Although such ideas are deemed 
necessal}'--in spite of essentialist beliefs that the character of art is 
presupposed by an aesthetic referent--they are not always sufficient. In short, 
we might say that aesthetic theory is reducible to two reciprocal but not 
always complementary conditions: (1) the subjective conditions, and (2) the 
objective conditions of the aesthetic experience as prerequisites to the 
possibility of art. The latter conditions reflect interests in the sublimity of 
space and time in relation to the art object as the proper substance for a 
noumenal world of appearances; that is, as the embodiment of spiritual and 
magical powers; as the manifestation of a cultural and environmental 
synthesis; and as the signification of life in anticipation of the mysteries it 
holds beyond the phenomenal world. The former conditions reflect the 
aesthetic attitude and are grounded empirically in the free interplay of the 
cognitive faculties where attending to objects for their intrinsic value, inherent 
beauty, or mere pleasure is the uninhibited focus of the percipient. The 
search for verification and validity of aesthetical ideas is metaphysical. Proof 
of the attitude theory's internal coherence involves the verification of many 
supporting concepts and propositions, the deduction of which may be 
summarized as a kind of definition of art. 
The Problem with Definitions of Art 
Traditionally, the generic definitions for art and work of art function in 
a bipolar relationship as the substance of aesthetic theory thereupon giving 
rise to the art experience. In their role, they extend and amplify empirical 
concepts and are separated only by environmental and cultural 
manifestations; i.e., intuitions that arise from observed phenomena and 
noumena, psychological and axiological data, all constituting the matter and 
form of aesthetic theory. Aesthetic attitude theory is, therefore, the primary 
vehicle through which philosophical and critical issues in the fine arts are 
broached. But there are many problems in verifying and validating a definition 
of art or work of art. Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz explains: ''The problem is to find 
the feature or features by which art can be distinguished from other forms of 
human activity.',1 He suggests, "It is easier to proceed intuitively, i.e. to 
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consider typical instances of art and describe their properties. ,,2 However, the 
nature of these difficulties is semantic. 
The word art possesses enigmatic qualities: magical powers 
obscured and hidden well within numerous connotations and within the many 
interrelated conditions in which it occurs. It is generally a reference to all art, 
and is objectified through any work that resembles our definition. The work 
possesses content, form, autonomy, and signifies itself. But the word incites 
thoughts, ideas, and feelings--although not always clear--and its signification 
is determined by the philosophical and aesthetical definitions rendered to it. 
Interpretations, criticisms, and judgments of the work of art are consequently 
attempts to rationalize the correlation between the work--as an autonomous 
thing that exists in and of itself--and the work as the manifestation of ideas and 
imperatives presented theoretically in philosophical aesthetics. And so, when 
we use the word art, do we address a thing or an idea?--Are we ambivalent or 
ambiguous? 
Such vacillating runs on all fours with the semantic difficulty of 
distinguishing between definitions that purport what all art ought to be, and 
those which define the peculiar qualities of a particular visual arts medium, as 
if such a definition stands paradigmatically for all art as well. The definitions 
that shape our understanding of essentialist aesthetic theory are 
controversial; in part, because paradigms and imperatives are often dogmatic 
and because words are insufficient when descriptions of the subjective 
conditions of the art experience are desired. 
Origins of Essentialist Aesthetics 
"The ancient conception of art: art as production governed by rules, 
lasted from the fifth century B.C. up to the sixteenth century A. D. The years 
1500 to 1750 brought a transition to the modern conception of art as the 
production of beauty. For some 150 years this definition went unchallenged 
until the year 1900 when doubts appeared whether the definition was as 
3satisfactory as it seemed. By 1950 it was clear that it was not.', In Plato's 
Republic, Book X, Socrates asks the question: "Which is the art of painting 
designed to be--an imitation of things as they are, or as they appear--of 
u4appearance or of reality? Socrates' question is early evidence of the 
controversy between the dynamics of appearance and reality in the fine arts. 
To respond, we shall take reality to mean, an imitation of things as they are, 
and appearance to relate more subjectively as a matter of taste--our interest 
lies in the latter. Following essentialist thinking, the necessary attention under 
such conditions may be presupposed by finding a common denominator for 
the different activities of painting. Once this ingredient is found, we need to ' establish a purpose which renders this human activity necessary. That such a 
purpose is found necessary is determined by the sufficiency with which we 
understand the affects of certain cognitive states. The concepts of 
Contemplation, Disinterestedness, Empathy and Psychical Distance are 
cognitive states deemed necessary by essentialists; they form the ground to 
7 7  
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6 The enjoyment of music, say Robin G. CollinCwood, is not 
1 
__
______________________________ 
the possibility of an aesthetic attitude and are, therefore, presuppositions to 
all matters of taste. To see truth or purpose in a painting requires proper 
preparation: a necessary and sufficient cognitive state. Such a mental 
predisposition is thus essential to answering Socrates' question. The following 
paragraphs offer a brief description of the range of these essentialist 
concepts: 
Contemplation 
Richard of Saint Victor, whose writings had a bent towards mystic 
theology, divides contemplation on epistemological grounds into six levels 
from the unintelligible free play of the imagination to contemplation of the 
S supersensible--"that which is above reason and contradictory to it." Clive Bell 
and Roger Fry, on the other hand, see it as a necessary and sufficient 
condition to all matters concerning subjective representations of the aesthetic 
objects. Leo Tolstoy views contemplation essential to his revelatory theory of 
art as religious perception. C. J. Ducasse explains that when a person is 
listening to music with an interest in its "emotional import" he is engaged in 
aesthetic contemplation. He writes, " ...  listening with aesthetic interest to sad 
music acquaints the listener with the taste of sadness, but does not ordinarily 
make him sad. ,
simply a sensuous experience "it is an imaginative experience." The taste of 
sadness that Ducasse mentions is an imaginal sadness: a sadness that is 
joyful rather than painful because sad music is representational not literal. 
Empathy 
The theory of empathy follows a deduction of various cognitive states 
which bring to view the psychological disposition of the percipient. Theodore 
Lipps, and Violet Paget, who used the pen name Vernon Lee, are the best 
known writers on the subject although they present different position. Lipps 
divides empathic acts into two types: (1) that of the contemplative self, a 
8 projection of self into the sensuously perceived object or "inner imitation,,,
and (2) that of the corporeal or sensual self, a projection of self through 
the real or actual movements and postures in a preoccupation with 
sense-feelings. Lee, on the other hand, focuses a major portion of her theory 
on the sensation of rising--as if "the mountain rises." Empathy, she concludes, 
is the result of a "a tendency to merge the activities of the perceiving subject 
.9 with the qualities of the perceived object. They differ in their interpretation 
10 of the German verb sich einfulen that means "to feel oneself into. ·
This is more akin to Lipps' theory of "empathy as a metaphysical and 
quasi-mytholoqical projection of the ego into the object or shape under 
observation. , T The other interpretation is fundamental to sympathy which is 
implied in Lee's theory," . . .  and turns it into a rather sympathetic, or as it has 
been called, inner, i.e., merely felt, mimicry of, for instance, the mountain's 
12 rising.,,
Disinterested ness 
Disinterestedness is traceable through the writings of Plato, twelfth 
century theologians (Aquinas and Richard of St. Victor), eighteenth century 
, 
,
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18 In other words, the interest we bring in anticipation of 
-------------------------------- 79 
British moralists (Lord Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Addision, Alison, Burke and 
Gerard), and the writings of Immanuel Kant, particularly the First Moment of 
his third critique, The Critique of Judgment. British moralist, Archibald Alison 
writes, for example: 
To perceive disinterestedly is to make one self a pure, 
unflawed mirror prepared to receive without distortion all the 
impressions, which the objects that are before us can 
13 produce.
And moralist Joseph Addison wrote: "The man of polite imagination is one 
14 who can look upon things without any desire for possession.' , Jerome 
Stolnitz credits Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury with being the "first philosopher 
15 to call attention to disinterested perception. ,, And Kant, who takes 
disinterestedness to be the subject of his First Moment, writes: "Taste is the 
faculty of judging an object or a method of rewesenting it by an entirely 
1 disinterested satisfaction or dissatisfaction.' , While a disinterested 
satisfaction is paradoxical, it is also a metaphor for the kind of attitude 
requisite to the possibility of an art experience. In the First Moment, Kant 
writes that "satisfaction is the good and the pleasant is bound up with 
17 interest;" i.e., the satisfaction which determines the judgment of taste is 
[thus] disinterested. 
a particular satisfaction inhibits our ability to experience the full intensity of the 
emotions imported by the art object. Disinterestedness is a necessary 
condition to minimizing aesthetic bias: those aesthetical ideas and prejudices 
which tend to colour our judgments of taste. 
Psychical Distance 
Edward Bullough, author of the theory of 'Psychical Distance' as 
a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle, does not use the term 
disinterestedness but his explanations of Distance require the same form of 
attention. For example, as an aesthetic principle Distance may be achieved 
by: 
..  . putting the phenomenon, so to speak, out of gear with our 
practical actual self . . .  by permitting only such reactions on 
our part as emphasize the 'objective' features of the experience, 
and by interpreting even our 'subjective' affections not as 
modes of our being but rather as characteristics of the 
19 phenomenon.
Bullough parallels Distance with our ability to objectify qualities of an 
experience concomitant with projecting ourselves vicariously into the 
phenomenon itself. By "putting a phenomenon out of gear with our practical 
self," he uses the concept of disinterested attention; by interpreting our being 
not as our own but as belonging to the phenomenon, he borrows from the 
concept of empathy; and through association of the former with the latter, 
contemplation is possible. Although Distance effectively employs 
,  
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_________________________________ 
disinterestedness, empathy and contemplation, it differs, slightly, in that it is 
not concerned with an analytic of the cognitive faculties but with maximizing 
aesthetic sensitivity and art appreciation. 
Anti-essentialist Claims 
W. B. Gallie explains that the nineteenth century doctrine "art is 
essentially imagination has dominated philosophical aesthetics for the last 
hundred and fifty years and during this period the vocabulary and the 
presuppositions of artistic and literary criticism ... has been profoundly 
affected by this Idealist doctrine.',20 Whether imagination or any other 
ingredient is characterized essential to the stability of a definition of art, most-­
if not all--writing on the aesthetics of art and nature, particularly nineteenth and 
early twentieth century writing, was essentialist. Anti-essentialism is thus a 
twentieth century phenomenon with published articles and books dating back 
to the late twenties, yet having a more substantial impact from the fifties to the 
present. 
In 19 56, anti-essentialist Morris Weitz asks: "Is aesthetic theory, in the 
sense of a true definition or set of necessary and sufficient properties of art, 
possible?,,21 Two questions comprise the one Weitz asks: (1) can art be 
defined, in the sense of one ubiquitous, real, or true definition? and (2 ) are 
necessary and sufficient properties antecedents to the truth or falsity of any 
definition of art? While Weitz acknowledges "theory has been central in 
aesthetics and is still the preoccupation of the philosophy of art" and that "its 
main avowed concern remains the determination of the nature of art that can 
2 2be formulated into a definition of it.,, he admonishes: 
Aesthetic theory--all of it--is wrong in principle in thinking that 
a correct theory is possible because it radically misconstrues 
the logic of the concept of art. Its main contention that "art" is 
amenable to real or true definitions is false. Its attempt to 
discover the necessary and sufficient properties of art is 
logically misbegotten for the very simple reason that such a 
set and conseguently, such a formula about it, is never 
forthcoming.2 3 
In his 19 58 article: Does traditional aesthetics rest on a mistake? 
W. E. Kennick, points to two mistakes he believes are the fault of traditional 
aesthetics. The first mistake occurs in the aesthetician's compulsion to reduce 
the complexities of art and aesthetic concepts to simple, no-nonsense real 
and true definitions. The first mistake he claims is "the assumption that, 
despite their differences, all works of art must possess some common nature, 
some distinctive set of characteristics that serve to separate art from 
24everything else ... .' , There are two parts to the second mistake: (1 ) 
"Criticism presupposes Aesthetic Theory.,,25 That is to say, " .... responsible 
criticism is im.Pt0ssible without standards or criteria universally applicable to all 
6works of art," and (2)  ethics and morality--as criteria for standards of critical 
8 0  
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judgment and taste, or as denominators of good and bad art--are based on 
extrinsic evaluations. Susanne K. Langer also points out that: "...  for a long 
time, philosophers hoped to find the true quality of meaning by collecting all 
its various manifestations and looking for a common ingredient. They talked 
more and more generally about "symbol-situations," believing that by 
generalization they might attain to the essential quality which all such 
27situations had in common.' , And Monroe C. Beardsley expresses the 
problem this way: 
There is one valuable--but inadequately appreciated-­
contribution that aesthetics has made to the growth of 20th 
century philosophy in general. Its generic concepts, art and 
work of art, have served as paradigm cases for most of the 
forms of waywardness to which concepts are subject: they 
28worked overtime as horrible examples.',
The Essentialist Fallacy and Its Impact Upon Essentialist Thinking 
What Kennick considers fundamentally a mistake,and Weitz, all wrong; what 
Langer describes as misguided, and Beardsley condemns, W. B. Gallie terms 
the essentialist fallacy and asserts: 
The [the idealists] presuppose, that is, that whenever we are 
in a position to define a substance or activity we must know 
its essence or ultimate nature--this by methods that are 
entirely different from those used in the experimental and 
mathematical sciences or in our commonsense judgments 
about minds and material thing. . .. I believe that they are 
29vitiated through and through by the "essentialist fallacy.',
The essentialist fallacy deems common qualities contradictory to 
reason. But in spite of this, Gallie asks, should nineteenth-century idealist 
aesthetic theories, be consigned to oblivion? While such theories seem 
doomed to failure, he suggests essentialism is nonetheless a tough 
captivating doctrine and that philosophers have championed the cause of 
anti-essentialism "only to slip back--as soon as their philosophic interest flags 
or their acquaintance with relevant scientific:fcrocedures is defective--into 
0unmistakably essentialist habits of thought." He adds: 
For essentialism is not only deep-rooted in men's thought 
habits--or linguistic habits; as it penetrates different 
departments of human thought it works on these, at first 
stimulating them but eventually blunting or distorting them in 
markedly different ways. This is why the abandonment of 
essentialist habits of thought in mechanics did not lead 
automatically to the abandonment of them in other parts of 
physics, or biology, psychology, and the political and social 
31sciences.
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35 His solution is that: 
________________________________ 
Given the above explanation, it is plausible that our ability to clarify 
32 associations is subordinate to our ability to make them. Our thought habits 
enable us to make associations, but our ability to clarify or make distinctions 
among these associations is restricted by our linguistic habits and by 
language in general. For example, the illocution: "This is a work of art! " is 
literally an associative claim. But if clarification is desired--for instance to: 
"What is a work of art?"--again as pointed out above, ordinary language 
suddenly seems ill-equipped to handle the numerous connotations of the 
word art. The problem this time, however, is with the emotive, tacit, ineffable, 
supersensible, and non-empirical, all of which are non-literal, but highly 
valued associations known to baffle even philosophers. There are, therefore, 
two sides to the empirical events that make up each aesthetic experience; 
one, literal and the other, non-literal. The task of defining art is useless 
without a reference to both, and the theorist or philosopher must find words to 
express that which is not only seen, as an outer experience but felt, as part of 
the inner self. The dilemma is therefore deep-rooted in the paradoxical task of 
transposing a non-literal side of the phenomenon into one that has objective 
validity--and to do this without loss of substance. The dilemma Gallie exposes 
has more to do with representing the language of feelings and emotions than 
necessary and sufficient conditions or common denominators. More 
importantly, he acknowledges the apparent unavoidable trap that finds its way 
into the language and thoughts of those who seek to disclaim the significance 
of essentialism in offering alternatives-- "only to slip back into essentialist 
habits of thought." 
Kennick states also that those who seek moral and ethical evaluations 
of art in the art object "may be looking in the wrong plac
3 
] but clearly they are 
right in assuming that there must be something to find. , He continues: 
They are not looking in the wrong place so much as they 
are looking for the wrong thing. The bases of responsible 
criticism are indeed to be found in the work of art and 
nowhere else, but this in no way implies that critical 
judgments presuppose any canons, rules, standards or 
3 4  criteria applicable to all works of art.
This tendency towards oversimplification, the reduction o f  ideas t o  simplifying 
formulae (e.g., common denominators, ingredients, generalizations, etc.) by 
the aesthetician, philosopher, critic, and even the artist, according to Kennick, 
"should not be scrapped merely because they fail to do what they are 
designed to do. ,
What fails to do one thing may do another. The mistake of 
the aestheticians can be turned to advantage. The suspicion 
that aesthetics is not nonsense is often justified. For the idea 
that there is a unity among the arts, properly employed, can 
lead to the uncovering of similarities which, when noticed, 
36 enrich our commerce with art.
, 
8 2  
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Concluding, he submits, "there is .. . a fruitful and enlightening search for 
similarities and resemblances in art that the search for the common 
37denominator sometimes furthers .... ,, Notwithstanding, the predicament 
with common denominators is real. The difficulty, Maurice Mandelbaum 
explains, is that: 
While we may acknowledge that it is difficult to define any set 
of attributes ... which can serve to characterize the nature of 
art, ... it is important to note that the difficulties inherent in 
this task are not really avoided bg those who appeal to the 
3notion of family resemblances.
Whether similarities, or Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblances 
(an anti-essentialist position), the attributes which all works of art have in 
common--fleeting as they may be due to the nature of our thought and 
linguistic inhibitions in a phenomenal world--are always there for the 
verification and validity of aesthetic theory--but not without controversy. 
Three Problems with Implementing Aesthetic Theory for Art Education 
Problem 1. At the basis of all aesthetic theory is the problem of verification-­
the same holds for the fine arts and most importantly for art education. 
Simply stated, art cannot be verified--clearly this is a difficulty for art education 
as well. Only those qualities in the aesthetic experience that we know but 
cannot effectively put into words are verifiable, and only that with which we so 
vicariously attach ourselves is valid--therefore, the aesthetic experience is 
valid for the percipient only. Ineffable qualities and a noumenal world of 
experiences demand a different form of communication. Hence, to verify an 
aesthetic emotion, the task is to transpose our innermost feelings using mere 
words and to do so in a manner that will enable others to share, with equal or 
even greater intensity, that emotion. Metaphors and other forms of figurative 
language have traditionally provided words more befitting the problem. But 
metaphors and their referents are neither literal nor can they be verified. In the 
fine arts, for example, the artistic imagination is the vehicle through which 
feelings are transposed and the medium, a transcription of those emotions-­
but still no verification because the aesthetic experience is a subjective 
experience and cannot be verified for the community (culture, race, religious 
sect, etc.). Consequently the design of aesthetic curricula for children or 
adults may involve the whole class but must objectify the individual. 
Problem 2. Definitions fail to adequately represent the art experience. A 
definition of aesthetics for art education would likely fare no differently 
although, historically, the role of aesthetic concepts and definitions could be 
construed as one really big attempt to define art--notwithstanding, mainly 
philosophers and aestheticians made such attempts. Aesthetic theory is 
surrounded by controversy much of which is due to a reduction of tenable 
principles to oversimplified definitions. Unquestionably, we need to know the 
purpose of aesthetic theory for art education, but is pursuit of a definition the 
Working Papers in Art Education 1991 
Marilyn Zurmuehlen Working Papers in Art Education, Vol. 10 [1991], Art. 18
https://ir.uiowa.edu/mzwp/vol10/iss1/18
DOI: 10.17077/2326-7070.1214
________________________________ 
proper objective? It is to the principles of aesthetic theory that we attribute 
centuries of insight and illumination. Only with aesthetic principles: 
presuppositions to the possibility of art, do we have the tools to implement 
aesthetic appreciation into the art education curriculum. 
Problem 3. 39 Philosophobia: A reference to art educators who regard 
reading aesthetic theory as an act of academic suffering--in some respects, 
they are correct. Only the problem is not going to vanish. To seek affirmation 
of our definitions of art, we must read aesthetic theory. The move from art 
education to philosophy may seem imposing but we cannot teach what we do 
not know, and we should not depend entirely on models and metaphors to 
supplement what we should be doing ourselves--reading! Aesthetic theory is 
philosophical and those aestheticians who are not philosophers (Bullough, 
for example, who is a psychologist), have very strong backgrounds in 
philosophy. Philosophical aesthetics is rich with ideas, concepts, and 
definitions all constituting a language of referents set in a logical schema. 
No one book can adequately prepare us for this type of aesthetic discourse; 
there are, however, many books and hundreds of scholarly articles in 
journals. Reading such materials may be augmented with courses in general 
philosophy and aesthetics, and through dialogical interaction with colleagues 
interested in aesthetic concepts. 
Actually, this overview could have effectively been summed up in the 
words of Jerome Stolnitz(1961) who wrote: "The meaning of a philosophical 
AO concept is often less important than its dialectical functions Regardless of 
impending disagreement, the dialectical function of aesthetic discourse is its 
verification. In closing, I will share this sudden insight that came upon me one 
morning about 4:00 a.m. while I was perched in bed reading an article on 
aesthetic attention: 
Every time I read a new concept or theory or definition about 
art, it has the sobering affect of making me feel that I knew 
very little all along. It leaves me curiously apprehensive that 
much of what I do not know about art, may be found in what 
I 41 have not read. 
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wisdom or knowledge; and Gr. phobos, fear--has one less syllable and is, 
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rhythmically, a little easier to enunciate. See Websters New Twentieth Century 
Dictionary Unabridged, 2nd. (1983), s. v.(s} "Philosopher and Phobia." 
40Jerome Stolnitz, "The Origins of Disinterestedness," The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 20 (1961): 140 
41Timothy O. Hicks, Confessions and Hallucinations at 4:00 a. m., 
from note card no. 49 written by the author, 2 February 1991. 
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